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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the high failure rates of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) over the last several 
decades, despite greater access to data, sophisticated 
business intelligence (BI) and data analytics (DA) tools, 
and work by industry professionals and academics to 
improve outcomes. We explore the possibility that the 
representativeness heuristic could play a role, and 
specifically, if prior probabilities are being ignored or 
discounted in M&A evaluations. We confirm our 
hypothesis using a regression discontinuity in time 
(RDiT) model and a two-way fixed effects model. By 
highlighting the negative consequences of this heuristic 
on management decisions, we promote the use of data-
driven decision making and the role of analytics in 
formulating business strategy. 
1. Introduction
As we entered the 21st century, there was a belief 
that as data exploded and computing power became 
more powerful, Business Intelligence (BI) and Data 
Analytics (DA) could dramatically increase the success 
rate of operational and strategic decision making (SDM) 
[1]. In the business sphere, SDM can be defined as “a 
strategic decision which is important, in terms of the 
actions taken, the resources committed, or the 
precedents set” [2]. These are less frequent than the day 
to day operational decisions and are more fundamental 
to the overall long-term prospects of the organization.  
Businesses pounced on this opportunity. In 2011, a 
survey conducted by Bloomberg revealed that 97% of 
all businesses with revenues exceeding $100 million 
were found to be using some form of analytics [3]. 
Despite the highly anticipated returns from these 
initiatives, results have been disappointing, particularly 
in SDM. In 2016, after years of investment and 
orientation towards decision making supported by 
highly sophisticated BI tools, PwC found that two-thirds 
(61%) of business leaders surveyed acknowledged their 
companies were not consistently making decisions 
guided by data and didn’t consider their own 
organizations to be highly data-driven [4]. A year later, 
a survey of 2,200 business executives conducted by 
McKinsey revealed that 72% thought bad strategic 
decisions were either as frequent as good ones or were 
the prevailing type within their organization. So it is 
clear that even with investment in technology and 
sincere effort, there remains a very large gap between 
optimal SDM and the current state of affairs. 
One great example of SDM is M&As. M&As have 
been a very popular proposition for firms to achieve 
strategic objectives and have remained that way for 
decades, this is demonstrated in Figure 1. With such 
M&A fervor, one could easily draw the conclusion that 
M&As are a consistent source of success for 
organizations. This is not the case. In November of 
1999, a landmark study on M&A failure rates was 
published by KPMG. They looked at 700 M&As across 
107 companies, mainly large, cross-border deals that 
took place between 1996-1998. What they found was 
that although many business executives subjectively 
classified their M&As as “successful”, when evaluated 
by an objective measure such as shareholder value, this 
was not the case. In fact, 83% of all M&As reviewed 
had either no impact or a negative impact on the 
organization [5]. A subsequent review of all the existing 
literature on M&As found that failure rates were 
between 70%-90% [6]. More recently, the global 
consulting firm LEK published findings that showed 
60% of all M&As destroy shareholder value [7].  
Figure 1. The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions 
and Alliances (IMAA, 2020) 
These persistent failure rates have compelled 
researchers to propose various critical success factors 





over the years, such as project planning, cultural match, 
strategic alignment, integration of human capital and 
more [5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. A summary 
of our literature review on traditional factors 
contributing to failure rates can be seen in Table 1. Yet, 
even after taking these factors into account, high failure 
rates persist. 
There has been quite a bit of work done in 
Behavioral Economics and Experimental Psychology 
that shows humans are afflicted by the use of heuristics, 
biases, and intuition when tackling complex prediction 
problems [15]. Heuristics, biases, and intuition can be 
considered a benefit when making most minor 
decisions, like whether to cross the street or not. There 
are even some rare cases where the use of day to day 
heuristics by experts has been considered central to 
business strategy [16]. However, when larger, more 
complex decisions are contemplated without significant 
time pressure, they are generally considered flaws, and 
inhibit optimal outcomes [15]. 
Table 1. Traditional Factors Literature Review 
Summary 
This research goes beyond traditional factors to 
consider if cognitive bias, specifically the 
representativeness heuristic, is playing a role in 
persistent failure rates. The representativeness heuristic 
is a shortcut that the human mind often takes when 
assessing if one thing belongs with another. This 
shortcut means prior probabilities are often not weighted 
appropriately in the decision-making process. This 
likely has serious consequences for SDM in business 
[15][17][18]. With this lens, we use econometric 
modeling to examine the effects of published high 
failure rates, which should have served as a strong prior 
probability for decision making. Our research question 
is as follows:  
RQ: Does insensitivity to prior probabilities 
negatively impact M&A outcomes? 
2. Literature Review
A domain of major cognitive biases, and the focus 
of this paper is the representativeness heuristic [19]. 
This heuristic says that individuals will assess a 
subjective probability of an event based on two things: 
(1) the degree to which the item is similar in essential
characteristics to its parent population and (2) the
degree to which the item reflects the salient features of
the process by which it is generated [19]. Several
experiments have been conducted to detect this
cognitive bias. Kahneman (2011) talks about an
experiment they did where the following information
was provided: “Steve is very shy and withdrawn,
invariably helpful but with little interest in people or in
the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a
need for order and structure, and a passion for detail.”
The question is then asked of respondents: “Is Steve
more likely to be a librarian or a farmer.” In this example
the qualitative information provided for “Steve” creates
the representation of a librarian. A person who hides in
books, works in a place of silence, and is not required to
use brute force. The description convinces the mind that
Steve must be a librarian; however, that qualitative
information that creates the representation in the mind
is low quality as it relates to making accurate
predictions. For example, there are 20 times more
farmers in the US than there are librarians [15]. These
statistical realities are far more important for making
accurate predictions, given that most professions have a
diverse group of practitioners. There is some evidence
that hiring practices are adversely impacted by biases
such as the representativeness heuristic [15].
A major form of bias that falls within the 
representativeness heuristic, with plenty of empirical 
support, is “insensitivity to prior probabilities” [20]. For 
classification problems it can also be called the “base 
rate fallacy” [21]. The distinction is simply the 
difference between prediction vs. classification, but the 
bias mechanism is the same. This bias means people 
underweight or ignore past outcomes or base rates in 
making a prediction or classification decision [15][22]. 
One experiment was conducted where subjects were 
shown a personality description, randomly selected 
from a group of engineers and lawyers, and asked to 
assess whether they were an engineer or a lawyer. In one 
condition there were no base rates were provided, in 
another the subjects were provided a base rate of 70 
engineers and 30 lawyers, and in the last condition the 
subjects were provided a base rate of 30 engineers and 
70 lawyers. In a sharp departure from what a rational 
Bayes model would dictate, all produced similar results, 
Factors Source
Cultural Match (KPMG., 1999)
(Christensen et al., 2011)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Bauer, Matzler, & Wolf, 2016)
Right Goal, Wrong Candidate/Strategic Alignment (Christensen et al., 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Baker & Niederman, 2014)
Integration of Human Capital (Christensen et al., 2011)
(Bauer & Matzler, 2014)
(Bauer, Matzler, & Wolf, 2016)
Adequate Due Diligence and Rigorous Process (KPMG, 1999)
(Bruner, 2005)
(Lewis,& McKone, 2016)
Making Sure the New Business can be 
Managed/Management Team
(KPMG, 1999)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
(Lewis,& McKone, 2016)
Recent Experiences/Overconfidence/CEO Hubris (Bruner, 2005)
(Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
Project Planning, Meeting the Challenge of Complexity (KPMG, 1999)
(Bruner, 2005)
Finding Synergies (KPMG, 1999)
(Garzella & Fiorentino, 2014)
Flexibility for Challenges/Adapt to Change (Bruner, 2005)
(Marks, & Marvis, 2011)
Valuation of Assets (Christensen et al., 2011)
Poor Communication (KPMG, 1999)
Departing from Business as Usual (Bruner, 2005)
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the base rates had no impact on the decision-making 
process [17]. Additional experiments have shown the 
level of insensitivity to prior probabilities or base rates 
can be altered by extreme rates, which may be 
recognized intuitively as relevant [23][24]. For 
example, if a prior probability is 60/40, it is likely to be 
discounted or discarded in favor of other, more easily 
processed qualitative information. However, if the prior 
probability is 95/5, there is some evidence that it may be 
recognized and processed as relevant [25][24]. The 
presence and behavior of this bias has many 
implications for SDM, particularly in decisions like 
M&As, where there are complex evaluation processes 
in place, but little to no focus on prior probabilities. This 
would lead to persistent high failure rates until the 
problem is acknowledged, and the process is debiased. 
With significant evidence that SDM is corrupted by 
cognitive biases, we aim to provide evidence of their 
presence in a particular strategic decision, M&As. 
Specifically, we look to see if there is behavior change 
at the individual or group level when exposed to high 
failure rates, which should have an impact on future 
decision making and levels of confidence. We will do 
this with a quantitative approach using two different 
econometric methods and applying them to firm level 
M&A data. 
3. Data & Methods
Our hypothesis regarding our research question 
(RQ) stated previously is as follows: 
Hypothesis: As new information is introduced 
showing higher failure rates in M&As than 
previously known, decision makers’ attitudes 
toward M&As will remain stable, demonstrating 
insensitivity to prior probabilities. 
To test our hypothesis, we use a quantitative 
approach. Given the availability of rich, publicly 
available data, we begin with a Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) model [26] on publicly 
available data from the Institute for Mergers, 
Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA) as a preliminary 
test. Given the preliminary evidence we found regarding 
the apparent presence of insensitivity to prior 
probabilities in M&A decision making, we then 
acquired a much larger data set from Bloomberg and 
analyzed it using a two-way fixed effects model. Both 
of these data sets were supplemented with control 
variables from various sources based on domain 
literature.  
3.1 Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) 
The data for this initial analysis came from three 
sources. The M&A data came from the Institute of 
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances (IMAA). Since 
fluctuations by industry are more important to 
businesses and economic phenomenon than fluctuations 
by country, the data was aggregated across the 14 top 
industries by year, from 1985 – 2018. Additional graphs 
for M&A trends in both value and number can be seen 
in Figures 2 and 3. 
There are many factors that can impact M&A 
activity. Interest rates, company balance sheets, tax cuts, 
technology leading to enhanced efficiency, and more 
[27]. Many of these factors are related to the strength of 
economic growth. To control for macroeconomic 
conditions, economic data for covariates was pulled 
from two additional sources. The first economic 
covariate, Gross World Product (GWP), is the 
accumulated value of all finished goods and services 
produced across all countries, measured annually in 
billions of USD [29]. This controls for fluctuations in 
the world economy and was retrieved from the Statista 
(2018) website. The trend of GWP over time from 1990 
– 2018 can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 2. M&As in Billions (USD) by Industry (1985 – 
2018) 
Figure 3. M&As (Total Number) by Industry (1985 – 
2018) 
The second economic covariate, taken from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) website, was the 
years that have been flagged as a “global recession” by 
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the following IMF definition: “years where the global 
GDP rates of growth were at 3% or less” [30]. There 
were 9 years of global recession 1990-1993, 1998, 
2001-2002, and 2008-2009. This covariate specifically 
controls for recession level downturns where we might 
see a sharp drop in M&A activity. We limited economic 
controls to these two given the availability of high-
quality data at the global level. 
The method used for this analysis is a Sharp 
Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) model [26]. 
The analysis was conducted with Stata software. RDiT 
is a fairly new method that facilitates the examination of 
treatment effects across an intervention or event that 
occurs in time. It is appropriate when randomization is 
infeasible and uses a quasi-experimental pre- and post-
test approach to establish the causal effects of 
interventions. By comparing observations lying closely 
on either side of an assigned cut-off, it is possible to 
estimate the average effect of the intervention. RDiT is 
not constrained by unobservables that can affect the 
outcome variable, as long as they do not change 
discontinuously at the threshold [26]. Given its non-
parametric nature, it also allows for the possibility of 
uncovering heterogenous treatment effects by using a 
local linear fit within each band, called bandwidth 
[31][32]. The ability to set small bands allows for high 
precision estimates as it will refit the regression each 
time as you go away from the cutoff. 
RDiT has been used to study the impact of 
regulations on the marketplace, public transit strikes on 
traffic congestion, promotions on economic activity, 
and more [32][33][34]. Thus, RDiT models are well 
suited to identify whether the targeted activity, in this 
case M&As over time, responds to new information. In 
our case, the intervention is the 1999 KPMG study and 
the cut-off was therefore assigned at 1999. The model 
was run separately for two dependent variables: value of 
M&As (in billions of USD) and number of M&As. An 
assumption of rationality (i.e. sensitivity to prior 
probabilities) would create the expectation of  a 
treatment effect, or a change in M&A behavior, after the 
cutoff of 1999, when decision makers have been 
exposed to the published high failure rates [17]. 
We controlled for fluctuations in industry, GWP, 
and recessions. Additionally, because the economic 
control variables were only available from 1990 on, the 
years of 1985 – 1989 were dropped, so that we would 
have complete information for each observation. Given 
the collinearity between the two economic covariates, 
GWP and the recession indicator, we ran a factor 
analysis for the discrete (GWP) and dichotomous 
(recessions) variables that  produced a single economic 
covariate. The results of the factor analysis are shown in 
Table 2. We also dropped the telecom industry variable 
due to multicollinearity. This brought our total number 
of observations down from N= 476 to N=405. Our two 
RDiT models for value and count and a discussion of the 
results are provided in Section 4.1. 
Figure 4. Gross World Product in Billions (GWP) (1990 
– 2018)
Table 2. Factor Analysis 
3.2 Two-way Fixed Effects 
Given the preliminary evidence for our hypothesis, 
we sought to refine and validate our results. M&A 
activity tends to be highly concentrated in places like 
Europe and North America, and to a lesser degree, Asia. 
After that there is a large drop off  [28]. Additionally, 
we tend to see M&A activity positively correlate with 
the strength of economies around the world [35][36]. 
Hence, we significantly expanded our sample and also 
controlled for economic strength and asymmetrical 
concentration of M&A deal-making. So, in addition to 
the treatment variable of interest (KPMG), and 
companies that use KPMG as an auditor (KPMG as 
auditor), we also added Country GDP by year (GDP), 
region, industry, type of market (World (Developed) vs. 
Emerging vs. Frontier), and deal status (completed vs 
terminated). 
We also wished to ensure that our results were not 
an artifact of the particular econometric method we 
used. Thus, we turned to a different type of analysis for 
this much larger data set. This analysis was also 
conducted with Stata software. Given the granular 
nature of the Bloomberg data set, and the potential for 
time and country (unit) variation, a two-way fixed 
effects model is a great econometric tool to isolate 
treatment effects given different baselines [37]. To get a 
robust set of panels for our two-way fixed effects 
analysis we needed to go through a lengthy process. 
This lengthy, end-to-end process can be seen in Figure 
5.
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Industries were consolidated from 23 to 10 based 
on outlier groups that had fewer than 20 transactions and 
could be reasonably associated with other industries. 
We needed to create panel data that would be suitable 
for our fixed effects models. There were many 
transactions per day and some units had multiple 
transactions in a single day. This motivated us to create 
monthly panels. The data was collapsed by month and 
country and dichotomous variables that existed for 
individual transactions were converted to rolled up 
numerical variables by specific month. This was done 
for industry, region, type of market, deal status, and 
KPMG auditor. Deal value was also summed up by 
month and country so that one value would exist for 
each unit in each time period. This gave us an N=3,797. 
Figure 5. Data processing for 152,590 M&A records 
from Bloomberg 
The data we used for this study came from a variety 
of sources. The main source of data came from 
Bloomberg Terminal (2020) and included all M&A 
transactions, dates, countries, industry data, deal status 
and deal value [40]. In addition to the core data set we 
added GDP by year and country from the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(2020) [38]. We were able to organize the countries by 
region according to the MSCI classification Index, an 
industry standard[39]. We also used the type of market 
from MSCI (2020) to add another control variable. 
Because we were specifically interested in the treatment 
effect of whether decision makers were considering the 
KPMG report in 1999 and the impact it may have had, 
we added two variables related to this. One was a 
dummy variable coded 0 prior to December of 1999 and 
1 thereafter. Since the report was published in 
November of 1999, this control variable tracked access 
to the report. We also wanted to know if there was a 
mitigating effect for clients who used KPMG as an 
auditor, due to the fact that there may have been more 
awareness regarding the report for KPMG clients. This 
information was obtained from “Audit Opinions” from 
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website 
[46]. Our models for value and count and a discussion 
of the results are provided in Section 4.2. 
4. Results
4.1 Regression Discontinuity in Time (RDiT) 
The analysis comprised of two models. Model 1 
used the value of M&As per year (in billions of USD) 
as its dependent variable and Model 2 used the total of 
M&As per year as its dependent variable. The control 
variables in both models were the industry dichotomous 
variables and Factor1, which was a synthetic variable 
made up of GWP and a recession indicator. Both models 
can be seen below in Table 3. 
Table 3. RDiT Models
We first present the results for the value of M&As 
(Model 1). The graphical representation (Figure 6) and 
model (Table 4) show a fairly small (79.98 billion), but 
statistically significant (z = 2.58) negative discontinuity 
(reduction in value of M&As) after 1999. The value of 
the coefficient represents the distance from the start of 
the regression curve to the right of the cutoff, to the end 
of the regression curve to the left of the cutoff. To check 
the robustness of our results, we also conducted a 
sensitivity analysis by removing the covariates (Figure 
7; Table 6). The discontinuity remained negative but lost 
some significance (z = 1.85) and shrank by about 34% 
to 52.6 billion. 
Figure 6. RDiT for M&As in Billions (USD) 
The second analysis used the number of M&As per 
year as the dependent variable. The graphical 
representation (Figure 8) and model (Table 6) show a 
large (- 492.04), but a highly statistically significant 
positive discontinuity after 1999. This represents a sharp 
increase in the number of M&As from 1999 to 2000. We 
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also conducted a sensitivity analysis by removing the 
covariates (Figure 9; Table 7). This created significant 
issues with the findings. The prior bandwidth of 2.24 
was no longer accepted by the software package, so it 
was increased to 2.75. With the new bandwidth, the plot 
looked fairly similar, but the RDiT model produced a 
coefficient of 78.109 and all statistical significance was 
lost (z = 1.1). 
Table 4. RDiT for M&As in Billions (USD) 
Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in 
Billions (USD) 
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in Billions 
(USD) 
Figure 8: RDiT for M&As in Numbers 
Table 6. RDiT for M&As in Numbers 
Figure 9: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in 
Numbers 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis - RDiT for M&As in 
Numbers
4.2 Two-way Fixed Effects 
The monthly panels allow us to conduct analyses on 
both value (Mvalueit) and count (Mcountit) of M&As by 
regressing these dependent variables on the variables of 
interest: (1) the availability of the KPMG report 
(KPMGit), and (2) the number of times KPMG served as 
auditor (KPMG as Auditorit), and control variables such 
as the yearly GDP of that country in the current year 
(GDPit), the yearly GDP of that country in the prior year 
(GDPit-1) (separate models), the region of that country 
(Regionit), the industry distribution of the deals in that 
country for that month (Industryit), the deal status 
distribution (completed or terminated) of the deals in 
that country for that month (Deal Statusit), and the type 
of market distribution of the deals in that country for that 
month (Type of Marketit). Upon running the models, 
records were eliminated for various missing values 
which gave a final observation count of N=2,959 for 
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current year GDP and N=2,174 for prior year GDP. The 
4 models for value and count, regressed on current and 
prior year GDP, can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8: Two-way Fixed Effects Models 
Specifically, we used a two-way fixed effects 
model with a unit and time fixed effect to control for 
unobservables across countries (unit) and months 
(time). The goal of this model is to reduce endogeneity 
and tease out the true impact of new information to 
M&A decision makers. We ran 8 distinct models which 
produced standardized coefficients. For value as a 
dependent variable (Mvalueit) we ran two models with 
current year GDP (GDPit) and two with prior year GDP 
(GDPit-1), varying standard errors between regular and 
robust, since GDP can be a predictor of M&A activity, 
but the reaction time is unclear [41]. We followed this 
by doing the same for count (Mcountit), where α=unit 
fixed effect and ϯ=time fixed effect. Note that B1=GDP 
for country and month (current and prior year used in 
distinct models), B2=Region of the Particular 
Transaction, B3=Industry of the Acquiring Firm, 
B4=Whether or not deal makers had access to the KPMG 
Report (starting in December 1999 =1, =0 prior), 
B5=Whether or not a deal was completed or terminated 
at some point in the process, B6=Type of Market 
according to MSCI (World, Emerging, or Frontier), and 
B7= Whether or not KPMG was the Acquiring 
company’s auditor. 
In model 1a, we evaluated count as the dependent 
variable with regular standard errors and current year 
GDP. For industry, Utilities served as our baseline, for 
markets, Frontier markets served as the baseline, and for 
region, Asia served as the baseline in our models. For 
all models, all coefficients positive or negative are 
relative to the baseline variables in that grouping. In 
model 1a we find that, controlling for factors previously 
mentioned, deal makers were not dissuaded by the 
KPMG report (variable of interest) stating that 83% of 
M&As fail. The KPMG coefficient was a relatively 
small negative (-.0012) and was not statistically 
significant (p=.8). All industries were highly significant 
with Financials being the largest statistically significant 
positive influencer of number of deals (.1439***). 
Communications was also a large influencer of number 
of deals (.1281***). All regions were statistically 
significant, three at the .01 level with North America 
being the largest (.0442***). Current year GDP was 
statistically significant (.0092***) as was Deal Status 
(Completed) (.3518***). Type of Market was not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, companies who 
had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be 
impacted by the report (-.0004***), although this effect 
size is small.  
In model 1b, we evaluated count as the dependent 
variable with robust standard errors and current year 
GDP. In model 1b we also find that deal makers were 
not dissuaded by the KPMG report (variable of interest). 
The KPMG report remained statistically insignificant. 
All industries remained highly significant, but all 
regions lost their statistical significance in this model. 
Current year GDP remained statistically significant as 
did Deal Status (Completed). Type of Market was not 
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as 
an auditor remained statistically significant.  
In model 2a, we evaluated count as the dependent 
variable with regular standard errors but controlled for 
prior year GDP instead of current year. In model 2a we 
find that, controlling for factors previously mentioned, 
deal makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report 
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was a 
relatively small negative (-.0012) and was not 
statistically significant (p=.874). All industries were 
highly significant with Financials being the largest 
statistically significant positive influencer of number of 
deals (.1400***). Communications was also a large 
influencer of number of deals (.1251***). All regions 
were statistically significant, three at the .01 level with 
North America being the largest (.0457***). Current 
year GDP was statistically significant at the .1 level 
(.0092*) and Deal Status was highly significant 
(Completed) (.3625***). Type of Market was not 
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as 
an auditor were more likely to be impacted by the report 
(-.0045***). 
In model 2b, we evaluated the same things as 2a 
except we used robust standard errors. In model 2b we 
find that, controlling for factors previously mentioned, 
deal makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report 
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was 
relatively small and negative (-.0012) and was not 
statistically significant (p=.874). All industries were 
highly significant with Financials being the largest 
statistically significant positive influencer of number of 
deals (.1400***). Communications was also a large 
influencer of number of deals (.1251***). All regions 
were statistically significant, three at the .01 level with 
North America being the largest (.0457***). Current 
year GDP was statistically significant at the .1 level 
(.0092*) and Deal Status was highly significant 
(Completed) (.3625***). Type of Market was not 
statistically significant. Companies who had KPMG as 
an auditor were more likely to be impacted by the report 
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(-.0045***). Model 1 and 2 standardized coefficients 
and p-values are below in Table 9. 
In model 3a, we evaluated M&A deal value as the 
dependent variable with regular standard errors and 
current year GDP. In model 3a we find that, controlling 
for factors previously mentioned, deal makers were not 
dissuaded by the KPMG report (variable of interest). 
The KPMG coefficient was negative (-.016) and was not 
statistically significant (p=.941). Four industries were 
statistically significant, two highly significant, 
Consumer Non-Cyclical (-.4307***) and Diversified (-
.0863***). For regions, only EMEA_CIS was 
significant at the .05 level (.1218**). Current year GDP 
was a statistically significant (-.8783***) negative 
influencer of deal values. Deal Status was highly 
positive influencer of deal values (Completed) 
(1.273***). World (Type of Market) was also positive 
(.9448***) and statistically significant. Companies who 
had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be 
impacted by the report (-.1240***). 
In model 3b, we evaluated M&A deal value as the 
dependent variable with robust standard errors and 
current year GDP. In model 3b we again find deal 
makers were not dissuaded by the KPMG report 
(variable of interest). The KPMG coefficient was not 
statistically significant (p=.788). Only Diversified 
remained highly significant for industry. Current year 
GDP remained statistically significant (-.8783**) at the 
.05 level. Deal Status lost statistical significance. World 
(Type of Market) remained statistically significant. 
Companies who had KPMG as an auditor remained 
significant at the .05 level. 
In model 4a, we evaluated M&A deal value as the 
dependent variable with regular standard errors but 
controlled for prior year GDP instead of current year. In 
model 4a we find that, controlling for factors previously 
mentioned, deal makers were not dissuaded by the 
KPMG report (variable of interest). The KPMG 
coefficient was negative (-.0224) and was not 
statistically significant (p=.946). Three industries were 
statistically significant, one highly significant, 
Consumer Non-Cyclical (-.4240***). For regions, only 
EMEA CIS was significant (.1989***). Prior year GDP 
was a statistically significant (-1.3874***) negative 
influencer of deal values. Deal Status was highly 
positive influencer of deal values (Completed) 
(1.094**). World (Type of Market) was also positive 
(1.0411***) and statistically significant. Companies 
who had KPMG as an auditor were more likely to be 
impacted by the report (-.1284***). 
In model 4b, we evaluated the same things as 4a 
except we used robust standard errors. In model 4b we 
again find deal makers were not dissuaded by the 
KPMG report (variable of interest). The KPMG 
coefficient was not statistically significant (p=.851). 
Two industries were statistically significant, Consumer 
Non-Cyclical and Diversified. For regions, EMEA CIS 
remained highly significant. Prior year GDP also 
remained highly significant. Deal Status lost statistical 
significance. World (Type of Market) remained highly 
significant. Companies who had KPMG as an auditor 
remained highly significant at the .01 level. Model 3 and 
4 standardized coefficients and p-values are in Table 10. 
Table 9: Two-way Fixed Effects Model for Count
Table 10: Two-way Fixed Effects Model for Value 
5. Conclusion & Discussion
Given the significant and high quality prior 
probability that came to light in 1999 from KPMG, and 
its extensive dissemination, we expected to see a 
significant shift in behavior in the M&A evaluation 
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process, and therefore a reduction in overall M&A 
activity. Introducing an 83% failure rate as a prior 
probability should substantially reduce future prospects 
for success and thus prevent a number of M&As from 
going forward, especially those expected to generate 
only marginal gains. Yet two separate data sets and two 
different methods appear to show a complete lack of 
reaction to this ominous new data. It also helps explain 
high persistent failure rates over decades in the face of 
technology, data, process, and research evolution. One 
interesting finding, however, was that for KPMG 
clients, there was a mitigating effect. This would 
suggest that greater awareness of the risks and expert 
support to help people understand the importance of 
prior probabilities, could nudge decision makers in the 
right direction.  
Although these results are not conclusive, they do 
provide substantial evidence that there is a level of 
insensitivity to prior probabilities in M&A evaluation, 
and it is likely a reason failure rates remain extremely 
high [5][6][7]. This is important not only for M&A 
decision makers, but also for those who seek to design 
decision support systems. Our analysis provides 
preliminary empirical evidence of the harmful use of 
heuristics in human judgement (i.e. ignoring prior 
probabilities) in the context of SDM and a follow-up 
study that examines this further is outlined in Section 6. 
6. Limitations
There are a couple of limitations to this study that
we are looking to address with additional work on this 
topic. First, cognitive biases occur at the individual 
level, and our data is at the organizational level. 
However, the heuristics used by individual managers 
ultimately impact their organizational strategies and 
outcomes. Thus, we ran a pilot study designed to 
examine how individuals make decisions in M&A 
scenarios using traditional factors and prior 
probabilities. By varying the published failure rates in 
the survey study, we are able to explore human 
judgement under uncertainty and specifically examine 
the sensitivity (or insensitivity) to prior probabilities at 
the individual level. In this survey study we controlled 
for demographics and based on the literature on 
cognitive biases, we included independent variables on 
the following: Need for Cognition [42], Cognitive 
Reflection Test [43], and Impulsivity markers [43]. We 
plan to follow up with a larger scale study that examines 
human judgement in strategic decision making that will 
allow us to more clearly demonstrate the impact of this 
representativeness heuristic on M&A failures. 
The second limitation is that this is a review of only 
one cognitive bias, although one we believe the 
evidence shows that it is highly impactful. There are 
other cognitive biases that likely influence the process. 
In decision making, parties required to make 
judgements tend to conflate what is accurate or fair with 
what provides the most benefit for that party. This is 
called self-serving bias [44]. For example, if you are on 
a management team and expect a promotion to come out 
of an M&A that moves forward, that M&A is likely to 
look more attractive to you than what the evidence 
dictates (John Kelly, Partner, Head of Global Integration 
and Separation Advisory for KPMG, personal 
interview, May 18, 2020). Another example of a bias 
that likely plays a role in M&As is the hot-hand fallacy. 
If someone has had a few successes in a row, it is 
believed that their next endeavor will be a success. 
However, with this limited sample, it is more likely that 
a few successes in a row is due to random chance rather 
than being a predictor of future success, particularly if 
those successes came in other types of endeavors [45]. 
More cognitive biases need further investigation as they 
pertain to the M&A process so a more comprehensive 
understanding can be developed. 
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